{"id":5959,"date":"2026-05-18T01:36:00","date_gmt":"2026-05-17T23:36:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/lma\/index.php\/2026\/05\/18\/nigeria-anti-isis-operation-security-sovereignty\/"},"modified":"2026-05-29T00:59:35","modified_gmt":"2026-05-28T22:59:35","slug":"nigeria-anti-isis-operation-security-sovereignty","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mezghena.org\/index.php\/en\/2026\/05\/18\/nigeria-anti-isis-operation-security-sovereignty\/","title":{"rendered":"Nigeria: the anti-ISIS operation and security sovereignty"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

The announcement of a joint US-Nigerian operation against a senior Islamic State figure in north-eastern Nigeria can be read as a success only if it is kept at the right scale. It may be a tactical blow. It is not, by itself, proof that the war is being brought under control.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A tactical victory in a long war<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Counterterrorism communication is built around names, targets and operational results. A commander is identified, a network is said to be weakened, a territory is described as contested or regained. This language has a military function. It also has a political one: it reassures allies, signals capacity to domestic opinion and tells rival armed groups that the state can still strike.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In Nigeria, that language meets a harder reality. The north-east has lived for years under overlapping insurgencies, fragmented armed groups, displaced communities, damaged local economies and a public authority often present through checkpoints before it is present through schools, courts or health services. A successful strike does not erase that terrain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sovereignty as negotiated dependence<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The central issue is not whether Abuja has the right to cooperate with Washington. States at war cooperate. The issue is what this cooperation reveals. When the fight against jihadist organisations relies on foreign intelligence, training, equipment or operational backing, sovereignty does not disappear. It becomes negotiated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is the uncomfortable grammar of the counterterrorism age. A state remains formally sovereign, but part of its coercive capacity depends on external technologies and external partners. The public narrative insists on national command. The operational reality often points to shared intelligence, remote surveillance, logistical support and diplomatic bargaining.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Sahel enters Nigeria<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Lake Chad basin is no longer a peripheral battlefield. It is one of the spaces where the Sahel, central Africa and West Africa meet through violence, smuggling routes, displaced populations and armed movements that do not respect borders. The Nigerian war is therefore not only Nigerian. It is linked to Niger, Chad, Cameroon and the broader regional fracture opened by the collapse of old security arrangements in the Sahel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is why the operation matters beyond its immediate military result. It shows how the United States seeks to remain inserted in the regional security architecture, even as African governments increasingly speak the language of sovereignty. It also shows how difficult it is for Abuja to contain a war whose geography exceeds the Nigerian state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What the announcement does not settle<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The essential questions remain open: who controls the territory after the strike, who protects civilians, who restores schools, who secures roads, who rebuilds trust between communities and the state? A targeted operation can remove a figure. It cannot rebuild political authority.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

That is the limit of the victory narrative. Counterterrorism can kill. It can disrupt. It can buy time. But when it becomes the main language of state presence, it also exposes the weakness of the state it claims to defend.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Sources utilis\u00e9es<\/h2>\n\n\n